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ABSTACT
As the UN has declared the years 2014-2024 the “Decade of Sustainable Energy for All”, countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa struggle with the transition towards more sustainable and more inclusive energy infrastructures. In many rural 
areas, electrification rates remain as low as 1-2%. For many countries, one of the main barriers for rural electrification 
is the legacy of a model of top-down planning, large-scale power generation and a centralized topology of the 
electricity infrastructure. Nonetheless, historiography on electricity infrastructures in Africa is nearly non-existent. At 
the example of Tanzania this paper shows, that the centralized power models which dominate the continent today 
were shaped by modernization and development discourses during the late colonial and post-independence period. 
Because of its particular characteristics, electricity lent itself perfectly to the goal of making development measurable 
— a goal which was essential to a “high modernist” vision of development, advocated by new nation states as 
well as international funders. The paper illustrates how large hydropower projects proved successful in expanding 
generation capacities and urban electrification rates, but failed in providing electricity to rural areas and created path-
dependencies which have led to dead ends in the last 20 years.
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SUBHEAD REQUIRED
While Europe and other post-industrial economies are struggling with the transition to more flexible and adaptable 
low-carbon electricity infrastructure, much of the developing world faces challenges on a much more basic level. In 
Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa) for example, only 14 percent of rural households have access to any 
electricity at all, according to a widely cited estimate.1 As in Europe however, the legacy of inadequate past electricity 
infrastructure remains one of the main barriers for the transition towards a more sustainable, more flexible and 
especially in the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, a more inclusive energy system. Most African countries have inherited a 
model of top-down planning, large-scale generation (mostly through hydropower plants) and centralized transmission, 
which “focuses on large-scale energy consumers whose activity influences macro-economic indicators like GNP, and 
labels a broad range of domestic and rural electricity benefits and beneficiaries as ‘uneconomic’ or expensive social 
welfare” (Showers 2011).2 The long-term neglect of participatory, bottom-up and decentralized approaches is not 
1   IEA (International Energy Agency), Energy for All. Financing Access for the Poor. Special early excerpt of the World Energy Outlook 
2011, Paris 2012. (online). http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/resources/energydevelopment/accesstoelectricity/.
2   Kate B. Showers, Electrifying Africa: an environmental, history with policy implications’, in: Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human 
Special Session: Past and future energy infrastructures 
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only due to the legacy of existing physical infrastructure, but also due to the interests of national policy institutions, 
international donor relations and a governing paradigm of centralized power systems. It has only been recently 
acknowledged by some African governments that there is a centralized power model crisis3, leading them to integrate 
a “decentralized track”4 into their national electrification strategies, promoting small power producers and mini-grids in 
rural areas.
At the same time, it seems that big and mega-engineering projects for electricity generation and transmission 
continue to dominate the political agenda throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. Posing as an alleged single technological 
fix for a country’s unreliable and insufficient electricity infrastructure, these projects prevail in the debate on how 
to prioritize needs for investment in the competition for scarce capital. The absence of historians and of historical 
perspective in this debate is particularly noteworthy. Except for a few laudable exceptions5, works that treat the 
history of electricity in Sub-Saharan Africa (except for South Africa) are rare and studies with a focus on infrastructure 
history are non-existent. It shall be argued in this paper, that the detailed knowledge of how the centralized electricity 
infrastructures, which dominate on the continent today, have historically emerged is not only a valuable but essential 
aspect of this debate, as a glance to the industrialized West shows. 
Historiography of electricity in Europe and the United States has contributed much to widening the traditional 
“engineering perspective” and enabling a much deeper understanding of the social complexity which underlies 
electricity infrastructure. For example, Gilson has shown that in Germany in the first half of the 20th century a 
pressure group made up from political institutions, large-scale electro-industry and financial capital played an 
essential role in establishing a “dogma of the economic superiority” of the centralized power model in academia.6 
This inherent superiority has been convincingly questioned by Stier.7 The concept of decentralized cogeneration 
of heat and electricity was discussed at an early stage of German electrification as an option with a higher overall 
efficiency than single-purpose electricity generation. It was only dismissed because economists and engineers of the 
time had a narrow focus on electricity generation. Models of “decentralized and customer-oriented, cost-effective 
and democratically controlled power supply” existed in some regions but fell victim to the drastic centralization policy 
of National Socialism. Some authors have gone as far as to radically deconstruct structuralist approaches. In his 
study on Switzerland, Gugerli has argued that its electrification was essentially a result of societal communication 
about the potentials and consequences of electricity.8 One doesn’t have to follow the radical nature of his thesis to 
acknowledge the importance of historical discourses in shaping electricity infrastructures.
Using the example of Tanzania, this paper therefore looks at the historical discourses associated with the emergence of 
centralized power models in Sub-Saharan Africa in the late colonial and early post-independence era. It is firstly argued 
that it was not only due to advances in long-distance electricity transmission or an inherent technical or economical 
superiority that was the main driver for the emergence of the centralized power model. Instead the centralized power 
models were the result of a particularly sweeping vision of development, using benefits of technical and scientific 
progress and measuring progress in technical and economic indicators. This vision was derived from the historical 
industrialization in the West, inspired by large-scale river basin development projects like the Tennessee Valley Authority 
(TVA) and advocated by the newly emerging interventionist development states as well as international organizations. 
Secondly, it will be shown that because of its particular characteristics, electricity perfectly lends itself to this vision 
of development. Thirdly, the role of the different decision makers in establishing the centralized power model will 
be discussed. It will be argued that hydropower development in postcolonial Africa was not primarily an attempt of 
authoritarian national states to engineer their environments as described in James C. Scotts widely acknowledged 
Geography 93,3 (2011), 193–221.
3   Stephen Karekezi, Renewables in Africa – meeting the energy needs of the poor, in: Energy Policy 30, 11–12 (2002), 1059–1069; C. M. 
Haanyika, Rural electrification in Zambia: a policy institutional analysis, in: Energy Policy 36, 3 (2008), 1044–1058.
4   Bernard William Tenenbaum, Chris Greacen, Tilak Siyambalapitiya, James Knuckles, From the bottom up: how small power producers 
and mini-grids can deliver electrification and renewable energy in Africa . Washington, D.C. 2014.
5   Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, Electricity Networks in Africa: A Comparative Study, or How to Write Social History from Economic 
Sources, in: Toyin Falola/ Christian Jennings (eds.), Sources and Methods in African History, 2003, 346-360; Ghanadan, Rebecca, Public 
Service or Commodity Goods? Electricity Reforms, Access, and the Politics of Development in Tanzania. Unv. Diss, University of California, 
Berkeley, USA 2008; Shower, Electrifying Africa.
6   Norbert Gilson, Konzepte von Elektrizitätsversorgung und Elektrizitätswirtschaft: Zur Entstehung eines neuen Fachgebietes der 
Technikwissenschaften zwischen 1880 und 1945. Stuttgart 1994.
7   Bernhard Stier, Staat und Strom: die politische Steuerung des Elektrizitätssystems in Deutschland 1890 – 1950. Ubstadt-Weiher 1999.
8   Gugerli, David, Redeströme: Zur Elektrifizierung der Schweiz 1880-1914. Zürich 1996.275
book “Seeing like a state”, but was largely driven by interests of foreign industry, development aid organizations 
and international funding agencies such as the World Bank.9 It will finally be shown that this legacy of a centralized 
electricity infrastructure, which almost exclusively relied on hydropower until 2002, left the Tanzanian energy sector 
badly positioned to deal with the challenges of the late 20th and early 21st century: The need for flexibility, adaptability to 
changing demand and the urgent need to attract private capital for modernization and expansion.
The paper is based on preliminary results of an ongoing research project on the history of electrification in Tanzania. 
The project makes use of written sources from the British mandated Tanganyika Territory and post-independence 
Tanzania, planning documents and reports from the state utility, international consultants and organizations 
associated with early development funding and assistance as well as contemporary academic literature. Archival 
work will be supplemented by expert interviews and has been carried out in the national archives of Tanzania and the 
UK, and at the Tanzanian national electricity utility Tanesco. At the methodological level the project seeks to explore 
ways of writing a history of electrification in Sub-Saharan Africa, given that written sources are scarce and dispersed 
amongst the archives of a multitude of national and international actors– a research challenge that Tanzania generally 
shares with many other former colonies in Africa. 
From the turn of the 20th century, when a private German company installed the first wood-fired steam turbines for 
power generation Dar es Salaam until the early 1930ies, electricity in Tanganyika was supplied by a few isolated small-
scale generators and hydro-power plants.10 In Dar es Salaam and a few cities along the railroads they supplied power 
to the colonial administration, European and some Asian city-dwellers, providing them with the amenities of domestic 
and street lighting. Africans were not considered eligible as customers nor thought to be able to pay for electricity. 
Nevertheless, the British administration was aware of the potential of electric power to increase productivity and 
profitability of the colonial extractive industries. A report from 1928 described electricity as the most effective form of 
power for machinery at the plantations for sisal, the colony’s major export commodity.11 Consequently, Tanzania’s first 
medium-sized hydroelectric plant, which started operation in 1936 at Pangani Falls, supplied the local sisal industry 
through a 400 km transmission system. Still, in 1955 the country’s total installed capacity was at 29 MW only.12 
In the first two decades of British colonial administration, the economic policy of Tanganyika was mainly focused on 
extractive industries. This changed after World War II, when colonial administrations shifted to a concept of integrated 
social-economic development. The 1946 Colonial Development and Welfare Act emphasized “native development” 
and “social welfare” as a part of broader economic considerations. This program was accompagnied by the rise 
of of the interventionist development state and a “particularly sweeping vision of how the benefits of technical and 
scientific progress might be applied-usually through the state in every field of human activity”, which James Scott has 
called “high modernism”. It implies the administrative ordering of nature and society to make them “legible” to central 
authorities, manipulating complex circumstances into simplified and aggregated data. When this ideology results into 
attempts authoritarian states to engineer their social environments it can become lethal – especially when a “prostrate 
civil society” lacks the ability to resist the governments plans.13 
Under the British mandate, Tanganyika proved to be one of the most fertile grounds for the high modernist ideology. 
During World War II the British Colonial Regime began planning large-scale agricultural development projects and 
mobilizing the necessary labour. The most ambitious was the gigantic groundnut scheme, which failed due to its 
narrow agronomic and abstract design, and the planners “blind faith in machinery and large-scale operation”.14 
After independence Julius Nyerere adopted the colonialist view that successful economic development requires 
a strong state. Consequently, Tanzania’s natural, industrial, and communications resources were nationalized in 
the Arusha Declaration in 1967. Tanzanias “ujamaa” villagization program in the early 1970s sets a classical and 
well-documented example of state-initiated social engineering. In the course of the campaign more than 5 million 
Tanzanians were resettled in villages where the layouts, housing designs, and local economies were planned, partly or 
wholly, by officials of the central government. Nyerere’s argument for the ujamaa villages was the following:
9   James C. Scott, Seeing like a State – How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Conditions Have Failed. New Haven/London 1998.
10   H. A. Byatt, From H. A. Byatt, Administrator, Dar-Es-Salaam to Principal Secretary of State for the Colonies, London, 9th June 1920, 
Tanganyika Territory No. 224. Public Record Office, Kew. PRO T 161-1049. Tanzania was a German colony before World War I.
11   SPARKS&PARTNERS, Report by Messrs. SPARKS&PARTNERS 1928, Colonial Office, Kew. CO 691-98-3.
12   John Frederick Rowland Hill, Tanganyika: A Review of Its Resources and Their Development. Dar es Salaam 1955.
13   Scott, Seeing like a State.
14   Scott, Seeing like a State, 229.276
 “And if you ask me why the government wants us to live in villages, the answer is just as simple: 
unless we do we shall not be able to provide ourselves with the things we need to develop our land 
and to raise our standard of living. We shall not be able to use tractors; (…) it will be quite impossible 
to start small village industries, and instead we shall have to go on depending on the towns for all our 
requirements; and if we had a plentiful supply of electric power we should never be able to connect it 
up to each isolated homestead.”15 
The pursuit of electricity as a modernizing and developmental force for state-led development coincided with the 
global rise of an ideology of multipurpose river basin planning.16 This was the idea of managing an entire river for 
human benefit, for hydroelectric power production, navigation, irrigation and flood control. The success of the TVA, 
“the granddaddy of all regional development projects”17, following its formation in 1933, inspired visions of river 
basin planning as a global tool for development in the 1950s.18 In addition, technological advances in long-distance 
transmission made centralized generation more economically viable and opened up prospects for mineral exploitation 
using cheap electricity from hydropower. Colonial governments all over the African continent commissioned 
hydropower surveys and started large dam projects, which were readily continued by the new states after 
independence. The exported model of river basin planning, however, was more focused on industrial and agricultural 
growth rather than on regional needs for social development. Rural Electrification, job creation and the provision of 
infrastructure services was given low priority.19
Despite its African socialists’ rhetoric of local small-scale development, the model of river basin development was 
as attractive to Tanzania’s post-independence government and to internatoinal funders. Encouraged by the World 
Bank the Swedish Institute for Development Assistance (SIDA) began working on the Great Ruaha river basin during 
the 1960s. Kidatu, where constructions began in 1969 and were completed in 1980, became the first large-scale 
hydropower project in Tanzania, paving the way for the beginning of the big dam era. The debates associated 
with the project firstly exemplify the rationale underlying the planning and construction of big dams for hydropower 
generation and in turn the emergence of centralized power infrastructures in many African countries, which could 
be rightfully called “high modernist”.20 Secondly, they show that it was less the authoritarian state, as suggested by 
Scott, but international development organizations that advocated and enforced the mega-engineering of natural 
environments for the single purpose of hydropower generation for industry and urban areas and to the detriment of 
rural development. This was partly made possible by the change of power relations between local actors and different 
international actors in the context of the postwar shift from bilateral colonial relationships to the multilateralism of 
development assistance. On a formal level, sovereignty turned these relations into one among equals; but, as Cooper 
has lately suggested, “independence turned entitlement into supplication”.21 This became apparent when interests 
conflicted in regard to the purpose of large dams. The Tanzanian government, the water authority and President 
Nyerere were in favour of a multipurpose project. Drawing on the British colonial plans for agricultural development, 
they had made irrigation an important part of the five-year plan of 1964. In contrast, the World Bank changed from 
supporting large-scale irrigation to supporting large-scale power production during the 1960s. Comparative studies, 
giving no space to irrigation benefits provided the necessary arguments for Tanzania’s government to change its 
opinion. Consequently, plans for a multipurpose project at Wami River were given up in favour of the single-purpose 
Great Ruaha Project. 
15   Julius K. Nyerere, “President’s Inaugural Address” (December 10, 1962), quoted from Scott 1998, 230
16   Patrick McCully, Silenced Rivers: The Ecology and Politics of Large Dams. London 1996.
17   Scott, Seeing like a State, 6.
18   In 1956, the UN Secretary General declared that “River basin development is now recognized as an essential feature of 
economic development (UN EcoSoc Council Office Record 21st Session, 1956, quoted in: Heather J. Hoag, Transplanting the TVA? 
International Contributions to Postwar River Development in Tanzania, in: Comparative Technology Transfer and Society 4, 3, (2006), 
247–267, 253.
19   The Volta River Project in Ghana for example, one of the first and most prominent examples for river basin planning in Africa, was mainly 
built to produce power for processing Ghana’s bauxite deposits into aluminum. Its centerpiece, the 80-meter Akosombo Dam was heralded 
as “a solid symbol in the dream of prosperity” upon commissioning in 1966 (Nkrumah switches on Volta River power” (1966, January 24). 
The Nationalist; quoted from Hoa, Transplanting the TVA, 249).
20   The debates have been well documented in: May-Britt Öhman, Taming Exotic Beauties: Swedish Hydropower Constructions in Tanzania in 
the Era of Development Assistance, 1960s – 1990s. Unpubl. Diss, Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden 2007.
21   Frederick Cooper, Writing the History of Development, in: Corinna R. Unger, Stephan Malinowski and Andreas Eckert (eds.), 
Modernizing Missions: Approaches to ‘Developing’ the Non-Western World after 1945 special issue, Journal of Modern European History, 8, 
1 (2010), 5–23.277
Hydroelectricity generation perfectly lended itself to the high modernist goal of making development “legible”, giving it the 
decisive advantage over other development goals like irrigation. For Great Ruaha, one contemporary consultant pointedly 
stated that only power generation could provide the fixed values that the World Bank needed for their calculations:
“Money should be made to talk: each one of the parties should be made to weigh the money value of 
their wishes against the costs to be covered. – In this respect power seems to be superior. Opinions 
are divided as to the relative benefits in the future, but one thing is absolutely certain: plans for power 
are much more definite and much more accessible to assessments of costs and benefits, in a word 
much more tangible, than plans for flood control and irrigation; however important the latter may be in 
the future, they are at present, to say the least of it, slightly vague. The important thing is that money 
should be permitted to talk and to dictate decisions, and so it does: it talks to Tanesco the way it 
always talks to power enterprises.”22
The Kidatu and Mtera plants in the Great Ruaha river basin were the largest of about half a dozen hydropower 
projects which substantially transformed the Tanzanian electricity infrastructure. At the time of independence it 
consisted of a few isolated grids in larger cities and a low-voltage grid supplying hydropower from Pangani Falls 
to the sisal plantations in the north. In 1990 high voltage transmission lines connected the key hydropower sites at 
Pangani and Greater Ruaha rivers with the coastal grid system around Dar es Salaam and most of the bigger cities 
in the northern part of the country.23 Hydropower development dramatically increased the country’s total installed 
capacity, which had been below 50 MW in 1960 – a low figure even for a developing country.24 Between 1960 and 
1990, 380 MW of hydropower were added to the grid, about 200 MW of which from Great Ruaha, and by 1990 
hydropower contributed 95% of the countries total electricity generation.25 
The effects of this increase of this transition of the generation and transmission system on service provision show 
an ambivalent picture. On the one hand, it allowed for an increase of the number of connections from 11,000 in 
1950 to 156,000 in 1990, further rising to about half a million in 2000.26 It is one of the major accomplishments of 
state-led development, to deepen access to electricity in the urban areas beyond colonial service provision. Being a 
privilege a nearly exclusive privilege for the European and Asian population in colonial times, it became available to 
a base of urban African electricity users. By 2000, coverage had expanded to 59% of Dar es Salaam residents and 
around 30% in other urban areas. On the other hand, benefits of electricity access remained comparatively low on 
national scale and were unevenly distributed between urban and rural areas:27 In 2000 still only 10% of households in 
Tanzania had access to grid electricity and a mere 1% of households in rural areas.28 In regard to electricity provision, 
African socialists’ promise of rural development was not fulfilled. At Kidatu, for example, electricity leaves the 
hydropower site on 220 kV high-voltage transmission line, passing numerous unelectrified villages and going directly 
300 km to Dar es Salaam and the Ubungo control center for further distribution into the national grid. This picture 
seems to illlustrate, what Showers has conceptualized as an “urban exploitation of distant (invisible) ecosystems 
that accompanied expanded transmission capabilities”, connecting “widely separated islands of Neo-European 
technological modernity over the heads of excluded African majorities”.29
Its patterns of physical infrastructure was not the only feature of centralized power model, which made an extension 
of service provision to rural areas a particularly challenging undertaking, but also the associated monopolistic 
structures, tariff systems and planning processes. During colonial times, tariffs were sectorally and regionally highly 
differentiated and reflected local loads and generation costs. Two years after its nationalization in 1964, Tanesco 
22   World Bank consultant John Fletcher, quoted from Öhman, Taming Exotic Beauties, 186. As a closer look on the appraisal futhermore 
shows that it was the only World Bank’s methods of economic calculation, the “discounted cash flow” method and credits at a low rate 
of interest through which SIDA and the World Bank which made the Great Ruaha power project a it better alternative from a cost aspect 
compared to a diesel plant (Öhman, Taming Exotic Beauties)
23   Still, some cities especially in the western and southern parts of the country are not connected to the national grid and are supplied by 
isolated grids.
24   Hans Amann, Energy Supply and Economic Development in East Africa, London 1969.
25   Ghanadan, Public Service or Commodity Goods, 59.
26   Ghanada, Public Service or Commodity Goods.
27   Björn Kjellström, Maneno Katyega , Henry Kadete, Dolf Noppen, Abu Mvungi, Rural electrification in Tanzania. Past experiences – New 
Approaches. Stockholm 1992.
28   Ghanadan 2008.
29   Showers, Electrifying Africa, 215, 207.278
adopted a model of four standardized national tariffs. It was praised by contemporary experts for its simplicity, equal 
treatment of sectors and regions and increase of revenues but rendered isolated systems and rural electrification 
projects highly uneconomic. Except for a few projects, which were highly subsidized by the government, “RE (rural 
electrification - author’s note), remaine[d] in a very early stage of development which must be characterized as 
being just a wish or hope, formulated as a consequence of a rural-production-oriented development policy of “self-
reliance”.30 In reality, electricity policy and -planning was largely centrally administered, expert driven and emphasized 
macro-level objectives. The Power System Master Plan focused on generation and transmission up to the level of 
substations and was more or less detached from local distribution planning, which was done on branch level.31 
Besides the structural imbalance, giving advantage to urban areas, the transition to a centralized power infrastructure 
also lead to some inherent problems related to its high dependence on large hydropower plants. These problems 
became apparent when in 1992 a combination of factors, including of shortcomings of the Great Ruaha projects’ 
design, mismanagement and a natural drought led to a dramatically decrease in generation which affected the whole 
centralized national grid. For two years electricity had to be rationed in Dar es Salaam. With the first free elections 
shortly ahead in 1993, this supply crisis put the ruling Party of the Revolution under enourmous pressure to act. In 
the hectic attempt to expand power supply, the monopoly of Tanesco in electricity generation was lifted to invite 
private investors to build new power plants. Two Independent Power Producers were hastily contracted and started 
to build a new “emergency” power plant each, one was run with diesel, the other with gas. When the diesel plant 
was finally connected to the grid in 2002, it was among the most expensive projects of its kind on the continent.32 
It is not without a certain irony that the construction of a large hydropower plant which was not least motivated by 
the prospect of getting independent from diesel imports, finally lead to a chronic contractual dependency on an 
expensive diesel-powered plant. Whenever water levels are low at Mtera, Tanesco enters into a “financial limbo”, 
buying electricity at rates between 34-50 US cents from the independent power producers and selling it at around 12 
US cents.33 It has only been recently that efforts to escape this dead end – through tariff increases, a number of new 
generation and transmission projects which are financed either by the state or by public-private-partnerships, and a 
progressive regulatory framework for Small Power Producers – have delivered first successes.
30   Amann, Energy Supply and Economic Development, 126, 164.
31   It is only at present, that efforts are being made to merge both plans, as the former director of Tanesco’s research department stated in 
an interview.
32   Rebecca Ghanadan, Connected geographies and struggles over access: Electricity commercialisation in Tanzania, in: David A. 
McDonald (eds.), Electric Capitalism: Recolonising Africa on the Power Grid. Kapstadt 2009, 400-436; Michael Degani, Emergency Power: 
Time, Ethics, and Electricity in Postsocialist Tanzania, in: Sarah Strauss/ Stephanie Rupp/ Thomas Love (eds.), Cultures of Energy. Walnut 
Creek (2013), 177-193; Martin Walsh, The not-so-Great Ruaha and hidden histories of an environmental panic in Tanzania, in: Journal of 
Eastern African Studies 6, 2 (2012), 303–335.
33   Quoted from a keynote of theTanzanian Minister of Energy and Mines 2014 at the Powering Africa, Tanzania conference from in January 
2014 in Dar es Salaam.